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Department store customer stuck by hypodermic
needle left in jacket pocket denied recovery
by Lessie Gerhold-Lepp
In Macy's California, Inc. v. Superior Court of
Solano, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1995), a California Court of Appeals held that a depart-
ment store customer stuck by a hypodermic needle left
in the pocket of a jacket she tried on may not recover
emotional distress damages based on her fear of contact-
ing AIDS or other diseases in the absence of any
physical harm or detrimental change to her body.
On February 10, 1993, Catherine Tussy-Garber
("Tussy-Garber") tried on a jean jacket in a Fairfield,
California, Macy's ("Macy's") department store when a
hypodermic needle in the jacket stuck her hand. Appar-
ently, the needle remained in the jacket's pocket after a
previous customer purchased and returned the jacket.
The pocket also contained a knife and a metal pipe,
possibly for cocaine use, as well as an additional
hypodermic needle. After the incident, Tussy-Garber
underwent tests for HIV and preventative treatment for
hepatitis. According to Tussy-Garber, Macy's would not
assist in locating the person who returned the jacket "so
that she could find out if the person had AIDS." Tussy-
Garber further asserted that Macy's refused to help in
testing the needle for HIV or to pay for her required
treatments.
In February, 1994, Tussy-Garber and her
husband brought suit against Macy's for negligence,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of
consortium. Macy's moved to bar any recovery for
emotional distress. The lower court denied summary
adjudication, finding that Tussy-Garber sustained a
physical impact which placed her within the area of
physical risk. The court held that her recovery could
include any proven psychological reactions which
reasonably and foreseeably resulted from the incident.
Macy's then appealed.
Tussy-Garber did not test positive for HIV and,
as of May 1995, had not contracted hepatitis. According
to undisputed testimony, she possessed a one in 200,000
chance of HIV infection if the needle was contaminated.
Tussy-Garber listed the following emotional
injuries: insomnia, panic attacks, constant crying, short
temper with her family, worry about her family's ordeal
of being related to someone with HIV, nightsweats,
nightmares, anger, inability to provide adequate atten-
tion to her children, feelings of helplessness, and a
period of "deep mourning." Additionally, she described
the following physical injuries: vomiting, aches and
pains, diarrhea, uncontrolled weight fluctuations,
tiredness, rapid aging, and tumors on her liver.
Court examines Potter's "more likely
than not" test
In Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 25
Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993), the court developed a test
which "weighed the policy considerations involved in
imposing liability for emotional distress damages for
fear of cancer and severely restricted the circumstances
justifying such damages." In Potter, plaintiff landowners
lived adjacent to a landfill where the defendant dumped
toxic waste. The plaintiffs faced a greater risk of
developing cancer in the future due to their exposure to
the toxic waste; however, no plaintiff at the time
suffered from cancer or exhibited a precancerous
condition. The Potter court did not find any physical
injury, cellular damage, or immune system impairment
to the plaintiffs, and, therefore, did not determine
whether parasitic damages would be available. The court
also did not resolve whether the fear of cancer would be
adequate for emotional distress recovery in the absence
of physical illness. Potter reaffirmed the general
principal that there is "no duty to avoid negligently
causing emotional distress to another, and that damages
for emotional distress are recoverable only if the
defendant has breached some other duty to the plaintiff."
The Potter test requires:
[I]n the absence of a present physical injury
or illness, damages for fear of cancer may be
recovered only if the plaintiff pleads and
proves that (1) as a result of the defendant's
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negligent breach of a duty owed to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff is exposed to a toxic
substance which threatens cancer; and (2)
the plaintiff's fear stems from a knowledge,
corroborated by reliable medical or scien-
tific opinion, that it is more likely than not
that the plaintiff will develop cancer in the
future due to the toxic exposure.
Two courts extended the Potter "more likely
than not test" to cases involving AIDS/HIV. Herbert v.
Regents of Univ. of California, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709
(1994), barred a mother from recovery either as a direct
victim or as a bystander for injury to her three year old.
The child stuck himself with a hypodermic needle while
crawling on the floor of a room used as an AIDS clinic
the day before. Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172
(1994), denied recovery to a patient in a negligence
action against, among others, her HIV positive surgeon.
The plaintiff claimed that she underwent surgery without
being informed of the surgeon's HIV status.
The appellate court stated that Macy's presented
an issue left unaddressed by Potter, Herbert or Kerins.
The question remained: What is the degree of physical
injury required for "parasitic recovery of emotional
distress damages for fear of a disease without plaintiff
meeting the strict requirements of Potter."
Court examines the physical impact/
injury and duty standards
In examining Tussy-Garber's claim, the court
first looked to the traditional physical impact or injury
standards. The court acknowledged that physical injury
or impact is no longer required for recovery in negligent
infliction of emotional distress cases, as held in Molien
v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). In
Molien, the defendant misdiagnosed the plaintiff as
having a sexually transmitted disease, which caused
much "anxiety", "suspicion", and "hostility" between
the plaintiff and her husband. The court allowed
recovery of emotional distress damages without requir-
ing proof of physical impact or injury. The court also
acknowledged the holding in Pleasant v. Celli, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 663 (1993), which stated that intentional
wrongdoing or bad faith is not a prerequisite for
recovery in negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims.
Next, the court looked to whether Macy's owed
a duty to Tussy-Garber. Citing several cases, the court
outlined possible considerations regarding the duty of
care owed, including the following from Rowland v.
Christensen, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968):
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of
the burden to the defendant and consequences to
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach, and the avail-
ability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved.
Macy's contended that a "mere needle stick"
was insufficient for Tussy-Garber to show physical
injury. Macy's argued that Tussy-Garber must either
have tested positive for HIV or shown symptoms of the
actual onset of AIDS to avoid the Potter "more likely
than not" requirement.
Tussy-Garber insisted that neither Potter,
Herbert, nor Kerins applied since she sustained a direct
physical injury through the needle stick. She argued that
negligence law allowed her to recover for the emotional
distress and mental suffering accompanying her physical
injury. In an attempt to distinguish her case from Potter,
she compared HIV/AIDS with cancer. Tussy-Garber
stated that the public is exposed to carcinogens daily,
while AIDS may be avoided. She further argued that
cancer is sometimes curable, while AIDS is inevitably
fatal.
Needle stick determined not to be
"harmful"
For purposes of parasitic damages, the court
held that a needle stick does not in itself constitute harm.
The court stated that
[I]n a routine needle stick, harm, if it occurs, takes
place when a hazardous foreign substance, intro-
duced to the body through the needle, causes detri-
mental change to the body. Only if the plaintiff
proves detrimental change to the body may he or
she recover parasitic emotional distress damages.
Without such proof, the plaintiff must satisfy Potter's
more likely than not test.
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The court disagreed with Tussy-Garber's
contention that AIDS can easily be avoided and called
her arguments "overly simplistic." The court noted that
infection may occur in utero, through prophylactic
failure, through partners who "dissemble" and through
tainted blood. The court stated that precedent disfavors
recovery of emotional distress damages in connection
with actions alleging economic damages. In contrast,
precedent favors recovery in cases, such as medical
malpractice, which involve personal injury. The court
defined the question to be determined: What is "the
threshold for a personal injury which, under Potter,
would sustain parasitic damages for emotional distress."
Court creates new standard for recovery
In conclusion, the court denied summary
adjudication, stating that the lower court did not use the
correct legal standard when it applied the area of
physical risk or physical impact test to Tussy-Garber's
situation. The court held that a plaintiff must sustain a
detrimental bodily change to recover parasitic damages
for emotional distress. Therefore, the court granted
Macy's motion barring Tussy-Garber from recovery for
emotional distress damages.
Real estate seller wins battle over financing
condition
by Sara E. Neff
Real estate buyers and
sellers must now expressly contract
the extension of financing condi-
tions in real estate agreements. The
Massachusetts Court of Appeals
recently rejected the notion that
financing conditions in property
sales contracts implicitly extend
proportionally with renegotiated
closing dates in Churgin v. Hobbie,
655 N.E.2d 1280 (Mass. App. Ct.
1995). In an action between a buyer
and a seller arising from a real estate
contract, the appellate court reversed
a trial court's judgment in favor of
the buyer and concluded that the
extension of the closing date under
agreement did not extend the
deadline for exercising a mortgage
financing condition and that the
buyer's failure to give the seller
timely notice of an inability to
obtain financing was not an act of
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bad faith or unfair practice.
Overconfident buyer
failed to exercise option
On July 8, 1991, the seller,
Dr. Churgin, entered into an
agreement with a fellow veterinar-
ian, Dr. Hobbie, to sell the commer-
cial property she maintained in
Wenham, Massachusetts for
$375,000. The back page of the
agreement included two extension
forms following the signature
blocks: one for an "Extension for
Financing" and another for an
"Extension for Performance." In the
sale agreement, Dr. Hobbie condi-
tioned his performance on obtaining
a mortgage loan of $300,000 "on or
before 45 days of closing." The real
estate agreement, which made time
of the essence, set a closing date of
January 8, 1992. In order to exercise
the financing option and reclaim a
$46,875 deposit, Dr. Hobbie was
obliged to notify Dr. Churgin on or
before 45 days from the closing date
that he was unable to obtain the
requiste financing. As a result,
November 24, 1991, was established
as the cutoff date for exercising the
financing option .
Dr. Hobbie felt confident
that his net worth and "track record"
would enable him to secure financ-
ing. As a result, he neither applied
for mortgage financing by the option
deadline of November 24, 1991, nor
exercised his right to withdraw from
the agreement via the financing
option. After receiving a letter dated
December 10, 1991, which ex-
pressed Dr. Churgin's desire to close
on the agreed upon date, Dr. Hobbie
began discussions with a potential
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